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Xerub claimed it's theoretically possible that the decryption key could be used to watch the SEP do its work, which could potentially allow hackers to reverse-engineer its process and gain access to its contents, including passwords and fingerprint data. "I think public scrutiny will add to the security of SEP in the long run," xerub said, noting that was also his intention with releasing the key. "Obscurity helps security - I'm not denying that," he said, but added that relying on it for security isn't a good idea. "Is Apple not confident enough to push SEP decrypted as they did with kernels past iOS 10?" He added that while SEP is amazing tech the fact that it's a "black box" adds very little, if anything to security. "The fact that the SEP was hidden behind a key worries me," said xerub. MAC SHUTDOWN WHILE DECRYPTING CODESpeaking to TechRepublic, the hacker that released the key claimed that Apple's effort to obfuscate the code was itself cause for concern. The decryption key posted on GitHub yesterday would not enable hackers to access data stored inside the Secure Enclave, but it could allow hackers and security researchers to decrypt the firmware that controls it and potentially spot weaknesses in the code. Key is fully grown use to decrypt and to process The UID automatically changes every time a device is rebooted and remains unknown to other parts of the system, further enhancing its security.īeyond that, little is known about how the SEP actually works outside of Apple, but that's by design – the enclave's isolation serves to obfuscate it from the rest of the system, preventing hackers from rifling through its code to make it as secure as possible. One of the ways the SEP does this is by generating a Unique ID (UID) for each device for authentication purposes. ![]() MAC SHUTDOWN WHILE DECRYPTING PASSWORDThe encrypted SEP is completely isolated from the rest of the system and handles Touch ID transactions, password verifications, and other security processes on a separate OS to maintain data protection integrity even if the kernel has been compromised. MAC SHUTDOWN WHILE DECRYPTING HOW TOLinux 3UPCAWT605 2.6.35.686 #1 SMP Mon Oct 18 23:56: i686 i686 i386 GNU/LinuxĪny pointer what is the root cause of this problem or how to fix this.A hacker released what he claimed to be a firmware decryption key for Apple's Secure Enclave on Thursday, initially sparking fears that iOS security had been compromised.Īpple's Secure Enclave Processor (SEP) handles all cryptographic operations for the Apple Watch Series 2, the A7 processor that powers the iPhone 5s, the iPad Air, the iPad mini 2 and 3, and subsequent A-series chips. Now for the same application on Fedora 14, after reboot we have encountered the above problem. On reinstalling 1.0.0j-fips on this Machine error got fixed. Options: bn(64,32) md2(int) rc4(8x,mmx) des(ptr,risc1,16,long) blowfish(idx)Ĭompiler: gcc -fPIC -DOPENSSL_PIC -DZLIB -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -DKRB5_MIT -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall -O2 -g -pipe -Wall -Wp,-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -fexceptions -fstack-protector -param=ssp-buffer-size=4 -m32 -march=i686 -mtune=atom -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -Wa,-noexecstack -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DRMD160_ASM -DAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM M/C Details:Linux awtah.dispatchserver1 3.6.686 #1 SMP Mon Dec 17 21:36: i686 i686 i386 GNU/LinuxĮven though application uses it’s own opnesssl 0.9.8 and M/C have 1.0.0j-fips. error:1408F119:SSL routines:SS元_GET_RECORD:decryption failed or bad record mac:s3_pkt.c:426:Įrror:1408F10B:SSL routines:SS元_GET_RECORD:wrong version number:s3_pkt.c:288:Įrror:1408F096:SSL routines:SS元_GET_RECORD:encrypted length too long:s3_pkt.c:346: No change in code, certificate or in peer Application is done. ![]() Things are working fine and suddenly following errors are encountered. ![]()
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